But substance, as such, is not visible to the bodily eye, nor does it come under any one of the senses, nor under the imagination, but solely under the intellect, whose object is "what a thing is" (De Anima iii). It seems, therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men. But Christ's body seems to be definitively in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is exceeded by it. For since the way in which Christ is in this sacrament is entirely supernatural, it is visible in itself to a supernatural, i.e. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Objection 1. Reply to Objection 1. The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. The body of Christ remains in this sacrament not only until the morrow, but also in the future, so long as the sacramental species remain: and when they cease, Christ's body ceases to be under them, not because it depends on them, but because the relationship of Christ's body to those species is taken away, in the same way as God ceases to be the Lord of a creature which ceases to exist. It is this spiritual soul which, substantially joined with matter, sets up and constitutes an existing human being. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Consequently, it seems that Christ's body is not there in any way. Last updated by jill d #170087 5 months ago 1/31/2022 5:23 AM. The divine beatitude (26) THE BLESSED TRINITY ORIGIN: The question of origin or procession (27). But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter. But since "Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more" (Romans 6:9), His soul is always really united with His body. It seems that Christ's body is not truly there when flesh or a child appears miraculously in this sacrament. Secondly, because, as stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3; Article 3), Christ's body is substantially present in this sacrament. Further, it is impossible for two dimensive quantities to be together, even though one be separate from its subject, and the other in a natural body, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and the other animals. Q. Objection 3. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according to different likenesses. 75 - Of Man Who is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance: And in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence of the Soul (Seven Articles) . New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica) by Alfred J. Freddoso University of Notre Dame Prima Pars (Part 1) Table of contents: Part 1: . Everything has unity in the same way that it has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its being. By the power of the sacrament there is contained under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. But it is clear that the action of the visual power is not attributed to a wall in virtue of the fact that the colors whose likenesses are in the visual power exist in that wall. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both. viii (Did. Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals. Aquinas concludes that, although theology does not require philosophy to promote knowledge of God, philosophy nevertheless can be of service to the aims of theology. And although the truth corresponds with the figure, still the figure cannot equal it. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (I:75:6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. Therefore, it cannot begin again to be there by the consecration of the wine; and so Christ's body will not be contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly neither the entire Christ. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. But it belongs to the nature of this quantity that the various parts exist in various parts of place. On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. It discusses topics central to Christian morality, ethics, law, and the life of Christ, providing philosophical and theological solutions to common arguments and questions surrounding the Christian faith. Secondly, because a glorified body, which appears at will, disappears when it wills after the apparition; thus it is related (Luke 24:31) that our Lord "vanished out of sight" of the disciples. The Summa Theologica is divided into three parts. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. And therefore in this sacrament the body indeed of Christ is present by the power of the sacrament, but His soul from real concomitance. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. Objection 2. Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. Reply to Objection 3. Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. the Divine, intellect, and consequently to a beatified intellect, of angel or of man, which, through the participated glory of the Divine intellect, sees all supernatural things in the vision of the Divine Essence. 77: The Powers of the Soul in General: Q. Objection 1. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. Now it is evident that He is not there under the sacramental species, which is that of bread or wine. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. SUMMA THEOLOGICA. Further, whatever has per se existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. ii) that "when we are moved, the things within us are moved": and this is true even of the soul's spiritual substance. Summa Theologica Theme. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) Objection 1. But that which appears under the likeness of flesh in this sacrament, continues for a long time; indeed, one reads of its being sometimes enclosed, and, by order of many bishops, preserved in a pyx, which it would be wicked to think of Christ under His proper semblance. Is the soul wholly in each part of the body. A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasmsthat is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in youif the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. The union of body and soul Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form? iv). Theol.Imprimatur. But fire and air are bodies. vii). Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species. vii, 19), that "the soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. Objection 1. It is against these that Cyril says (Ep. Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. First of all, because Christ's body under its proper species can be seen only in one place, wherein it is definitively contained. Is the whole Christ under this sacrament? New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica) by Alfred J. Freddoso University of Notre Dame Pars Secunda-Secundae (Part 2-2) Table of contents: Part 2-2: Faith: . Sometimes it happens on the part of the beholders, whose eyes are so affected as if they outwardly saw flesh, or blood, or a child, while no change takes place in the sacrament. The Summa Theologi of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright 2017 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. Objection 4. Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation; the second . For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. I answer that, After what we have said above (Article 1), it must be held most certainly that the whole Christ is under each sacramental species yet not alike in each. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to be in this sacrament as in a place. Contents. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Christ's body is not in this sacrament definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species. But Christ's body as it is in this sacrament cannot be seen by any bodily eye. What are the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form? If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. In the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas says that "angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear." Source: Ia Q. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. 77: Fraud in Buying and Selling: Q. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this sacrament, as is evident to our senses. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliMARI IMMACULAT - SEDI SAPIENTI. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Further, the human body is a mixed body. Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sensefor instance, if two men had one eyethere would be several seers, but one sight. Therefore, if the dimensive quantity of Christ's body be in this sacrament together with the dimensive quantity of the host, the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is extended beyond the quantity of the host, which nevertheless is not without the substance of Christ's body. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. 2 Treatise on the Last End (Questions 1-5) 3 Treatise on Human Acts: Acts Peculiar to Man (Questions 6-21) 4 Treatise on the Passions (Questions 22-48) 5 Treatise on Habits (Questions 49-54) 6 Treatise on Habits in Particular (Questions 55-89) 7 Treatise on Law (Questions 90-108) Reply to Objection 1. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. Edus. animal. Further, the Philosopher says (De Gener. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Objection 4. Hence since it is seen in its proper species, and is adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in this sacrament. After the consecration, is the body of Christ moved when the host or chalice is moved? But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine 2. Reply to Objection 3. Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul. 78: The Specific Powers of the Soul: Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul. Yet Christ does not remain in this sacrament for all coming time. But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue. Acknowledgement: This digital file was produced through the kindness of Sandra K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 2 (Whether angels . For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above (I:75:5). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. As appears from what has been already said (Article 4), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one." I answer that, When any thing is one, as to subject, and manifold in being, there is nothing to hinder it from being moved in one respect, and yet to remain at rest in another just as it is one thing for a body to be white, and another thing, to be large; hence it can be moved as to its whiteness, and yet continue unmoved as to its magnitude. Because the change of the bread and wine is not terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. Reply to Objection 4. And to this mode can be reduced what we say of Christ, being moved accidentally, according to the existence which He has in this sacrament, in which He is not present as in a place. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. According to this being, then, Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only accidentally, because Christ is not in this sacrament as in a place, as stated above (Article 5). Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. But with things which can of themselves be in a place, like bodies, it is otherwise than with things which cannot of themselves be in a place, such as forms and spiritual substances. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form. I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. This answer does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil. Objection 3. Reply to Objection 3. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." It seems that the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by the eye, at least by a glorified one. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. Thus the soul is not in a part. Therefore He is moved when it is moved. A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. Questions 75-89 of the First Part (Prima pars) of St. Thomas's great Summa theologiae constitute what has been traditionally called "The Treatise on Man," or, as Pasnau prefers, "The Treatise on Human Nature." Pasnau discusses these fifteen questions in the twelve chapters, plus Introduction and Epilogue, that make up his book. Further, since Christ's is an organic body, it has parts determinately distant. We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body. The dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament not by way of commensuration, which is proper to quantity, and to which it belongs for the greater to be extended beyond the lesser; but in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2). Still the figure can not deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility which are many belonging to one species is there. Numerically one soul say, in accordance with the Philosopher ( Phys 5 ago! The matter not give incorruptibility, yet it can not be attributed to the nature of quantity... 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